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ABSTRACT:
This study investigates what Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) means to Vietnam’s smalland medium-size enterprise (SME) owners and workers, using Scott’s three-pillar (norms,
regulation, cognition) institutional framework. The findings are based on factory visits and
interviews with 40 managers/owners and 218 workers conducted in two sectors textile/garment/footwear (TGF) and food/beverage processing (FBP) - around Ho Chi Minh City
in 2011. Scott’s framework is useful in highlighting similarities and differences between these
two sectors. We found more stringent state regulation and greater industry pressure on the
quality and safety of products than on labour standards in both sectors. Most factories in the TGF
sector assembled for the global supply chains and are under pressure by industry norms, while
most companies in the FBP sector produced for the domestic market are subjected to greater
state regulation. Moreover, contributing critical perspectives to Scott’s framework, we found an
overlapping between the normative and the regulatory, and between the cognitive and the
industry norm, which reveals how institutional and cultural pressures contribute to different
outcomes in TGF and FBP sectors. We also contribute to Scott’s framework by analyzing the
unequal power relations in the global supply chains and explain how different levels of linkage
to the global systems explain different outcomes in FBP and TGF sectors. FBP workers in
domestic-serving factories negotiated for job stability, whereas workers in the export-oriented
TGF factories bargained for flexible work schedules in exchange for wages below the living
wage and overtime work.

KEYWORDS:
SME managers and workers, CSR, Vietnam, Food and beverage, Textiles/Garment and
Footwear

INTRODUCTION
The literature on small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) in developing countries has been growing, yet few studies have focused on
the actual perspectives of managers and workers. While scholars have paid attention to supply
chain pressures and the significance of CSR standards to SMEs in developing countries (Authors
A; Baden et al., 2009; Ciliberti et al., 2008; Lepoutre & Henné 2006), limited emphasis has been
on how SME labour and management view such pressures and relate them to CSR (Authors C;
Jamali et al., 2015; Moore & Spence, 2006; Morsing & Perrini, 2009). As highlighted by
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Lepoutre & Henne (2006) and Jamali et al. (2015), many studies do not employ theoretical
frameworks and mainly base their arguments on empirical observations. This paper contributes
to that gap in the literature by applying Scott´s institutional framework—in terms of norms,
regulation and cognition pillars—to explain how different sources of institutional pressures
explain variations in the understanding and practice of these two key SME stakeholders in
different industries. We selected two key industries with different levels of linkage to the global
economy—the export-oriented textile/garment/footwear sector (TGF) and the domestic-oriented
food/beverage processing (FBP) sector—to explore these overarching research questions: “What
does CSR, a Western concept, mean to SME owners and workers in these two different sectors?
To what extent can different sources of institutional pressures explain different meanings and
practices of CSR in SMEs in different industries?”
Using Scott´s framework, we dissect variations in the strengths of different types of
institutional pressures on CSR in these two industries, highlighting their similarities and
differences. But our application of Scott’s framework to the Vietnam case revealed two
important observations, informed by the critical perspectives, which we elaborated below: first,
the overlapping nature of the pillars; second, the unequal power relations among the actors in the
multi-tiered global supply chains.
In particular, we found inadequate and limited institutional pressures at the Normative
and Regulative levels in both sectors. At the Cognitive level, we found that “cultural pressure,”
or cognition of cultural norms, informed by historical understanding and cultural practices,
affects labour-management relations differently in these two industries. An important factor that
explains this variation involves different levels of linkage to the global economy: the exportoriented TGF sector with workers bargaining for flexible work schedules and living wages
versus the more domestic-oriented FBP sector with workers stressing the importance of job
stability and mutually respectful communications with management.
The historical socialist legacy of Vietnam is an important institutional context to
understand the practices of the SMEs in these two wage-labour sectors. As a self-proclaimed
‘‘market economy with a socialist orientation,’’ the state’s commitments to integrate into the
global market system since the late 1990s have been contradictory; yet socially responsible
practices have been observed at the SME level long before the arrival of CSR, which was
introduced by western institutions. Neoliberal institutions and Western governments (such as the
World Bank, the US government, the multinational companies, and the ILO) have put pressure
on the Vietnamese government to participate in CSR initiatives since 2002, and with increasing
urgency between 2004 and 2006. Since then, there have been studies about CSR in Vietnam:
from a critical study on historical development of CSR focusing on multinational companies
(MNCs) and their foreign-direct investment (FDI) suppliers (Tran 2011), to focus on public CSR
policy in Vietnam (Hamm 2012), to private regulation in Vietnam’s apparel and footwear
factories (Kim 2012), to an analysis of the complexities of the multi-level supply chain which
prevents code compliance at the expense of workers (Hoang and Jones 2012), to an in-depth
institutional analysis of managers and workers in one sector: the most important wage-earning
textile/garment/footwear sector in Vietnam (Authors C). This chapter adds to this small literature
by providing a theoretically-based analysis of CSR practices, and contrasting the views of
management and workers in SMEs in the two key industries, TGF and FBP, with different levels
of linkage to the global economy.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
CSR can be viewed as the societal expectations of businesses at a given time (Newell & Frynas
2007, Frynas 2009). More specifically, we adopt Blowfield and Frynas’ understanding of CSR as
companies having a responsibility: (a) for their impact on society and the natural environment,
sometimes beyond legal compliance and the liability of individuals; (b) for the behaviour of
others with whom they do business (e.g. within the supply chains); (c) to manage their
relationship with the wider society, whether for reasons of commercial viability or to add value
to society (Blowfield and Frynas 2005, p. 503). To exemplify this approach, we focus on labour–
management relations focusing on three dimensions (physical environment, working
environment, and labour conditions), bringing in the voices of managers and workers in SMEs in
the Vietnamese TGF manufacturing and the FBP sectors.
The literature on SMEs and CSR in developing countries has been growing (see e.g.
Jamali et al., 2015; Hamann et al., 2015; Engels-Zanden, 2015), yet with few studies focusing on
the actual perspectives of managers and workers as Authors C have done. A number of authors
(Prieto-Carron et al. 2006; Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011; Fox 2005; and Jamali et al., 2009)
call for inclusion of “Southern perspectives,” especially on issues that are often excluded from
CSR debates, such as inclusion of gender and actual effects as opposed to postulated effects of
CSR. As Khan and Lund-Thomsen and Authors C point out, a critical assessment of CSR based
on rarely-heard viewpoints from the bottom of the global supply chains can begin to unravel the
complexities of CSR in developing countries. Implementation of CSR practices often is
portrayed as leading to ‘win-win’ situations, stipulating economic as well as environmental or
health-related or labour gains in SMEs. Nevertheless, evidence shows us that such ‘win-win
situations’ rarely occur to SMEs, which in contrast are failing to see the gains and only feeling
pressures of decreasing sales prices and/or increasing costs (Baden et al., 2009; Skadegaard
Thorsen and Jeppesen 2011). Comparative studies of multiple sectors can provide particularly
helpful insights into similarities and differences between the sectors in terms of CSR practices
and the views of managers and workers (Authors A).
The institutional perspective has provided a useful lens for analyzing SMEs and CSR in
developing countries (Jamali et al. 2015; Authors C). The institutional lens allows us to go
beyond the regulatory nature of CSR language and incorporate historical and cultural practices
which are reflected in the cognition of cultural norms in socialist Vietnam. This approach allows
us to analyse institutional pressures, coming from both industry, historical, and cultural norms.
Thus it is consistent with the argument made by Jamali & Neville (2011) and Jamali et al., 2016
on the influence of historically grown national business systems, heritage and frameworks. In
particular, Scott’s 3-pronged framework (see below) allows for an assessment of management
and workers views on the influences of important dimensions for CSR practices (regulatory,
normative and cognitive) in the SMEs in the two sectors.
Building on these existing studies, this chapter applies Scott’s (2001) three-pillar
framework to a comparative study of two different sectors in Vietnam. We use the key aspects of
social institutions, defined as ‘social structures that have gained a high degree of resilience’ (p.
57) to frame and explain how they affect SME owners and workers in these two sectors
differently. The three pillars are: 1) 'regulatory' (laws, regulations and government policies); 2)
'normative' (‘normative rules’ that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension
into social life’); and 3) 'cognitive' (‘the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social
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reality and the frames through which meaning is made’) (Scott 2001; Amine and Staub 2009).
This multi-level structure embraces history, which is important to the analysis of socialist
Vietnam transitioning from a command economy to a market system fully integrated into the
global capitalist economy.
Next, we outline the methodology of this study, provide contextual information and
present empirical findings on the two sectors before we analyse how normative, regulatory and
cognitive systems affect CSR practices of the Vietnamese SME managers and workers in these
two sectors. Finally, we discuss how our findings contribute to the literature.

METHODOLOGY
This paper analyses a section of the data collected for a 2011-2012 study (Authors A and C),
focusing on the wage-labour manufacturing of the TGF and the FBP sectors. We collected a
convenience sample. The lack of availability of statistical information on the thousands of SMEs
in Vietnam prevented us from conducting a rigorous randomly selected sampling. Thus we do
not generalize our findings.
From June to December 2011, our team interviewed managers and workers from 20
SMEs in the TGF sector and 20 SMEs in the FBP sector in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) and
surrounding rural districts. We conducted three rounds of data collection among these forty
SMEs, resulting in a total of 40 interviews with management and 218 with workers: 125 in TGF
SMEs (94 females and 31 males) and 93 in FBP SMEs (48 females and 45 males). Most TGF
factories produce for export (75% of all TGF SMEs interviewed) while most FBP produce for
domestic markets (75% of all FBP SMEs interviewed). Most TGF firms are medium-size (65%
of TGF firms) and populated by female workers (74%), compared to a more equally split
situation in the FBP firms (both in size and gender).1 The average size of the FBP firms was 44
employees, while it was 126 employees for the TGF firms, and the TGF firms tend to have been
in operation longer than the FBP firms.2 For the analysis, we triangulated both qualitative and
quantitative data generated in interviews with management and workers, using SPSS for
quantitative analysis, and content analysis for qualitative analysis (including importing,
organizing, coding interview notes, which were translated from Vietnamese to English).

Contexts for Food & Beverage Processing and Textiles, Garment and Footwear
The TGF and FBP sectors consist of a large number of SMEs employing a high number of
workers. Based on a 2013 survey, there were 6,610 businesses and thousands of families
working in agricultural produce processing (Thanh Yen 2014, p. 1). These processing facilities
have generated 1.5 million direct jobs,3 with an average income of about VND 3.5 million per
month, and tens of millions of indirect jobs in materials production and services (Nguyen Trong
Thua, Director of Agro-Forestry Processing and Salt Industry Department, Ministry of

1

The official Vietnamese definition of a micro firm is up to nine employees, of a small firm 10-49 employees, and of a medium-sized firm 50-299.
See Authors B, tables VN.1-VN.4.
3
This list omitted two important categories, sugar-based products (such as candies and dried fruits), and baked goods (such as cakes and pizza),
which would increase the employment statistics.
2
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Agriculture and Rural Development, as cited in the Thanh Yen article, p. 1). On the other hand,
the more export-oriented TGF industry employed over 2 million workers in 4,000 enterprises
(The Vietnam Textile and Apparel Association), with a feminisation of the textile/garment
workforce in foreign-direct invested (FDI) factories: over 80% were young female workers (Tran
and Norlund 2014, p. 10).
In 2011, the monthly median wage for FBP workers was VND 2.7 million (US$130), and
VND 3 million (US$144) for TGF workers. In both sectors, there was no significant difference
in median monthly wages for female and male workers.4 Workers in the more export-oriented
TGF factories are paid by the piece rate, which is determined by their first-tier suppliers who
receive the subcontracting rate from the global brands. On the other hand, workers in the more
domestic-oriented FBP sector receive monthly wages with some overtime payments, and
bonuses in some cases. In a few export-oriented seafood companies, wages were based on a
piece-rate basis, with 1.5 times the regular wage payment for overtime work. In both sectors,
workers often receive some meager overtime compensation for dinner (VND 15,000 per night) in
addition to the 1.5 times regular wage (Authors A).
In terms of employment stability, the FBP sector (mostly for domestic market) fared
better than the TGF sector (mostly for export). The interviewed TGF factories had been exposed
to the global economic/financial fluctuations. The onset of the worldwide financial crisis at the
end of 2008 had impacted Vietnam in 2009, especially the export-oriented TGF sector, due to the
lower demand from Europe, the US and East Asian countries. This led to a reduction in
employment in nearly half of the TGF factories in 2010-2011, compared to only 25% in FBP
factories (Authors A).
The FBP sector and its insertion in the global economy
The FBP sector is a large, growing and highly diverse sector which includes many types
of food and drink products. The agricultural processing industry accounts for about 20 percent of
GDP in the whole processing sector, which has a 7 percent annual growth rate. It includes 12
main sub-sectors: rice (including noodles, pasta), coffee, rubber, tea, cashew, beverages
(including water, sugar cane, juices, alcohol-based drinks, coffee, tea, and milk), vegetables,
pepper, meat (including beef jerky), cultivated aqua products (including seafood, fish sauce),
food livestock, and woodworking.
In particular, the seafood processing industry plays an important role in Vietnam's total
exports, and the country ranks third on the top ten seafood exporters in the world as of 2014
(http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-fish-and-seafood-exporting-countries.html (accessed
July 26, 2016). Fishery products have ranked fifth in export value (following garment/textile,
electronics, crude oil and shoes) (Nguyen Hoai Nam, Vietnamese Seafood Export: Opportunities
and Challenges, Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers, 2013,
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Events/Sympo/pdf/130919_unido_04.pdf)). In 2010 fishery
production increased 406% relative to 1990, primarily due to expansion in aquaculture for
export, and created more than US$5.0 billion of export revenue (Nguyen, Minh Duc 2011). In
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Female and male workers in both sectors responded that it would be around VND 4 million.
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2015, Vietnam earned US$6.6 billion from seafood exports. The ongoing environmental crises in
central coast Vietnam could result in dire consequences for the FBP sector in general.5
The TGF sector and its insertion in the global economy
The TGF industry accounts for the largest share of the wage earning labour force since
Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007 (Tran & Norlund 2014). Since 2007, Vietnam has become a
major world exporter of textile/garment products, with exports reaching US$24.5 billion in 2014
(Donaldson 2015), second highest export value only to the mobile phones and components
industry (Ministry of Industry and Trade, “Garment and textile market achieved its growth in the
first 10 months,” 12/09/2014, http://www.moit.gov.vn/en/News/721/garment-and-textile-marketachieved-its-growth-in-the-first-10-months.aspx (accessed July 26, 2016). The United States
continues to be the largest market for Vietnam's textile and garment products (Vietnam News,
February 2015), with the EU second, followed by Japan, South Korea and Russia
(Business2Community.com, May 2015). Overall, apparel exports accounted for US$21 billion,
and textile exports only US$3 billion (Donaldson 2015). However, it is important to note that the
value-added that remained in the TGF industry remained very low (only 35% in 2011), since
most fabrics and accessories inputs for exported garments were imported and assembled in
Vietnam (Tran & Norlund 2014, p. 9).
The rapid integration of the TGF industry into global value chains has created at least
three tiers. The upper/first-tier includes foreign MNCs (corporate buyers and the brands) which
place orders with contract suppliers (often termed ‘first-tier suppliers’). Most of these first-tier
suppliers are from East Asian countries (especially Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Japan) and
who provided at least 70% of the inputs (Tran & Norlund 2014). These first-tier suppliers
produce and subcontract work to second-, third-, and fourth-tier Vietnamese subcontractors, most
of which are small- and medium-size firms.

FINDINGS
In this section, we present the findings for each institutional dimension. In each section, we start
with general observations of the findings, then we provide specific findings in each sector, with
examples of the effects of each level on workers and owners in their own voices. Overall,
applying the conceptual framework to Vietnam suggests that institutional pressures, at both
normative and regulatory levels, are limited and inadequate. However, analysing the cognitive
pressures in Vietnam highlights the significance of cultural norms which result in some
improvements in labour conditions, as discussed below.

Findings on the Normative Level
The normative level introduces a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social
life (Scott 2001). Codes of conduct (examples of industry norms) and industry standards (such as
5

Vietnam investigates mass fish deaths, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/21/vietnam-investigates-mass-fish-deaths-pollution.
Accessed April 28, 2016.
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ISO26000 and SA8000) constitute obligatory normative dimensions for SMEs. Moreover, norms
can be viewed by society as the expectation that a business adds value to society and fulfills its
responsibility to the society, the natural environment and others in the supply chains beyond
commercial viability (Blowfield & Frynas 2005; Frynas 2009).
Overall, we found that pressures from industry norms are inadequate and limited in the
area of CSR practices. Most MNCs do not enforce codes of conduct in their supplier factories
nor share the costs to implement a code, while keeping substantial pressure on other areas such
as price and product quality. Consequently, most interviewed SMEs do not have codes as it is
prohibitively expensive to do so.
As discussed further in the overlapping section below, in the context of Vietnam, we
argue that industry norms are not influenced only by what is happening within an industry, but
also by history and culture, including societal belief systems, which include workers’
perspectives that one should have decent wages and working conditions, job security and
benefits, and a clean working environment.
While codes of conduct are often perceived to be voluntary, in reality Vietnamese SMEs
experience them to be compulsory and that the companies have to comply with them if the SMEs
want to assemble products for MNCs. These requirements can be very costly for SMEs to
comply with and can lead to their exclusion from the MNCs` value chains (Baden et al. 2009;
Skadegaard Thorsen & Jeppesen 2010). Often, first-tier suppliers only pay some of those costs,
with the brands turning a blind eye to manufacturing conditions in the invisible subcontractors at
the lower tiers of the global supply chains. In addition, many SMEs might face a phenomenon
called “code mania” (Skadegaard Thorsen and Jeppesen 2010). Many subcontracting SMEs must
compete for orders from many first-tier suppliers in order to maintain full-time employment for
their workers. Thus, the SMEs must comply with different codes of conduct required by the top
two tiers, making it a confusing, costly, and untenable situation.
On general findings, we found higher awareness and adoption of industry norms among
FBP companies than TGF factories. This demonstrates an overlapping between industry norms
and cognitive pillars. All exporting FBP enterprises (25% of the FBP enterprises interviewed) are
certified in global management systems (such as HACCP, ISO, OHSAS, GMP). About 60% of
TGF managers stated that they were aware of the CSR concept, compared to 80% of the FBP
firms. Thirty percent of the interviewed FBP SMEs had a global management system as well as
the Vietnamese Food Administration standard, compared to only 5% of the interviewed TGF
firms reported adhering to certified management systems. Some FBP workers express knowledge
of these global industry norms. ‘Inspection by an external unit (according to ISO 26000). I don't
yet understand the whole process of inspection based on this ISO’ (a worker in a vegetable
processing export company). ‘I think inspection in the company is good. We have HACCP code
of conduct’ (a worker in a seafood enterprise).
However, we found low levels of CSR report preparation in both sectors. Fewer than onethird (30%) of TGF SMEs prepared CSR reports, while slightly fewer FBP SMEs (25%) stated
they did so (Authors A). There are three possible explanations for these low figures: 1. the
MNCs do not have to enforce compliance if these SMEs are not visible to public scrutiny. MNC
buyers and their Tier 1 suppliers often turn a blind eye to these subcontracting SMEs; 2. Most
SMEs have a very small profit margins, thus they cannot afford to comply even if they are aware
of CSR requirements; 3. Report preparation is time consuming, especially when SMEs have to
comply with many codes of conduct, the “code mania” discussed earlier.
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Transnational monitoring of codes of conduct and standards — provided by third-party
global monitors or auditors—tends to focus on the consistent quality of the products. In the TGF
sector, managers/owners found that most industry norms are aimed at ensuring product quality,
safety and performance standards for the end consumers, not the labour standards of the workers
who manufactured those products. Sometimes, the buyers pay for and send in third-party global
monitors or auditors, such as Intertek, SGS6 or Fair Labour Association (FLA) with branches in
Vietnam, to carry out factory inspections.7 In one medium-size garment factory, the final
products must meet the Eco Tex standards, otherwise it cannot export to the EU. At another
medium-size shoe factory, one management representative said that ‘we must follow what our
buyers regulate; otherwise, we cannot export our shoes’. In this case, SGS was the transnational
auditor. One representative at another medium-size garment factory said: ‘Foreign buyers from
Hong Kong often come to the factory to assess the quality of the working environment.
Otherwise, foreign buyers hired global auditing companies based in Vietnam with mainly
Vietnamese employees. For instance, Intertek did come to audit our factory’.
Similar priority requirements existed for the FBP exporting firms. A manager of a
medium-size seafood company connected ISO22000 requirements to quality products and
sanitation standards (as an end), while working conditions served only as a means: ‘(We have)
ISO22000, (but) even ISO does not put any pressure on us. They only require us to meet their
quality and sanitation standards. In order to produce quality products, work conditions have to
be good which means that we have to make adjustment on our water treatment and energy
systems. They do not demand that we do anything, but in the long run, we still need to pay
attention to these issues’., as expressed by a manager from a seafood company: ‘Ensuring
customers' standards on food safety. Guaranteeing food safety and sanitation, as well as
environmental protection. (We are) HACCP (certified)’.
Influences of Industry Norms on SME Owners/Managers
SME management perspectives point to the MNC’s failure to share the costs of monitoring and
implementing codes of conduct. Most SME managers do not receive support from their foreign
suppliers or MNCs because the main concerns are on-time delivery of final products with
consistent quality for profit maximisation, not codes of conduct compliance. Many Vietnamese
SME managers complained that these top tiers put pressure on them to keep subcontracting
prices stable, even when input costs go up, at the expense of the workers whose wages were
reduced: ‘If the raw material prices increase, our customers [the MNCs] will pay for it, but they
do not raise subcontract price for our workers. The reason is that they provide the raw
materials, so they are willing to raise prices for their own products, but not for workers’ wages’
(a manager from a medium-size garment firm).
The pressure/influence of industry norms/standards in the export-oriented TGF sector is
noticeable. Most TGF factories have to pay the certification (and sometimes also inspection)
costs to be able to export their assembled products. Management at a medium-size factory
making leather purses and gloves explained: ‘Funds are needed to carry out these [CSR]
responsibilities. Due to the fact that this is our company's responsibility, we cannot ignore this
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http://www.intertek.com/what-we-do/; http://www.sgs.vn/en/Our-Company/About-SGS/SGS-in-Brief/SGS-in-Vietnam.aspx.
Sometimes the buyers themselves come down to the factories to inspect. We found that some Japanese buyers did factory inspection.
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CSR cost, but have to include it in the final price of our products’. By absorbing this cost, they
lose their price competitiveness compared to other factories that spend nothing on CSR. While
this problem is more overt in the TGF sector, for the few export-oriented FBP companies,
management also had to absorb CSR-related costs. A president of a vegetable processing
company (exporting to the EU) shared: ‘We handle this [ISO22000 requirements] by providing
gloves and masks which protect the workers and also prevents the contamination of our
products. Periodic health check is once every 6 months…This is included in ISO22000…If
workers are sick, they are allowed to leave until they become healthy again. Social insurance
does not cover these [costs]’. This indicates that global standards, if implemented properly, can
help improve labour conditions.
Moreover, we found an overlapping between the normative (industry norms) and the
regulatory (labour legislation and state regulation) pillars because the first item in many codes of
conduct of most industry norms often refers to the need to comply with national labour
laws/code. The two major Vietnamese labour laws, the Labour Code and the Social Insurance
Law, clearly stipulate the required labour standards such as wages, overtime work and social
insurance benefits. The next section, the Regulatory Systems, presents the progressive
Vietnamese labour laws and the regulatory system, and discusses the findings on the regulatory
pressures and their limits.

Findings on the Regulatory Level
The regulatory system relates to laws, regulations and government policies. It revolves around
compliance, legitimacy, and coercive mechanisms and indicators (Scott 1995/2001). Factors in
the regulatory system can either encourage or discourage CSR practices through incentives or
disincentives. Stringent enforcement can promulgate healthy and safety practices and certain
standards in the working environment in SMEs. We first present the nature of state regulation in
the context of socialist Vietnam, then specific the effects of state regulation on each sector from
the voices of SME owners and workers.
Labour Legislation
Wage and overtime issues are directly related to industry norms in terms of codes of conduct and
are observed in narratives and practices of both managers and workers. As required by most
codes of conduct, compliance with national labour law, the context of Article 91 of the Labour
Code requires a living wage, not a minimum wage: “minimum wage, as the lowest level to pay
simple labour, must cover at least the subsistence level [living wage] of workers and their
families” (Labour Code 2012, p. 19). This “living wage” clause is consistent with that of some
multi-firm stakeholder codes such as SA8000 and the Worker Rights Consortium.
Workers reported that their monthly wages did not cover their basic necessities, even
when the median wages in both FTG and FBP sectors were higher than the governmentsanctioned minimum wage.8 Their monthly ‘living wage’ ranged from VND 4.4 million (average
for FBP workers) to VND 4.7 million (average for TGF workers). Overall, about 47% responded

8

Worker-led strike waves in 2005 and 2006 led to annual minimum wage increases since 2006 (Tran, 2007). In 2011, the government stipulated
monthly minimum wage was VND 2 million in Ho Chi Minh City, and VND 1.78 million in non-metro areas.
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that they barely earned enough for basic necessities and had no savings; 42% said that they did
not make enough and had to save and/or borrow to pay for necessities. Only 11% said that they
earned more than enough for necessities and had some savings.
Wages below the living wage have led to overtime work to make ends meet. The increase
in overtime hours is a direct violation to the overtime stipulation in the Labour Code. The Labour
Code allows only 200 hours of overtime work per year (or a maximum of 300 hours in TGF
industries with the approval of the labour unions). However, in practice, most codes of conduct
allow up to 12 hours of overtime per week which could add up to 624 hours per year, more than
double the permitted overtime (ILSSA, 2004). We found that the median overtime hours per
week for men and women in TGF was nine hours per week (459 hours/year) and 10 hours in
FBP (520 hours/year), more than double the approved overtime work hours (200-300 hours).9
We found gender difference in overtime work: on average, male workers did more overtime per
week than female workers. In TGF factories, males averaged 12 hours/week versus 8 hours for
females; in FBP factories, males averaged 14.5 hours/week versus 11 hours/week for females.
Female workers may have to do housework thus cannot do more overtime work. Consequently,
many workers in both sectors (42% had to save and borrow to pay for necessities) need to
borrow money from their owners/managers to pay for basic expenses.
Moreover, wage is directly connected to social insurance, as required by Article 89 of the
2014 Social Insurance Law, entitled “Monthly mandatory social insurance.” This law stipulates
that by January 1, 2018, management has to pay monthly social insurance based on the gross
salary, which includes the minimum wage as well as all forms of allowances and bonuses (Social
Insurance Law 2014, 38-39). Thus, the minimum wage has to be raised to reach a living wage by
2018 with the accompanying level of social insurance fees that management has to contribute to
the state funds for workers.
Next we turn to the state regulatory system, and discuss the findings on the regulatory
pressures and their limits.
State regulation
The state regulates industry through a mixed structure, encompassing both state and quasi-state
agencies. Regulations focus primarily on environmental standards and the working environment
(such as work safety), not on labour standards (such as wages and overtime). Both industry
norms/standards and state regulation can disadvantage SMEs by imposing inspection costs and
requiring them to produce time-consuming reports.
Industry is charged two types of fees: state management fees by the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE), and service fees by a quasi-state agency, the
Institute of Water, Resources, Environment, Technology, (IWRETE). DONRE is a government
environmental entity which has jurisdiction over both city/province and district levels; it
manages natural resources (including land, water, minerals and marine resources) and the
environment of the administrative location in which it resides.10 DONRE charges management
fees to monitor SME compliance with state environmental laws, which it does by visiting

Overtime work was not always available: “Work overtime when more orders are available. Got paid by the hour x 1.5 times. Overtime only when
extra orders are available” stated a worker in a small garment factory.
10
The cities’ people's committees govern DONRE administratively, and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment directs and supervises
DONRE technically.
9
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factories and filing reports. On the other hand, IWRETE, an environmental consultancy, charges
service fees as stipulated on the contracts signed with foreign buyers (MNCs who place orders
with SMEs), with SMEs directly, and even in contracts signed with government entities. As
such, IWRETE service fees vary, depending on the scope, scale and complexities of what it
needs to monitor at the SME premises (such as toxic materials, waste water, dust, or noise).
State regulation has targeted different areas in the two sectors. In the TGF sector, workers
pointed out that labour inspections have been more lax compared to environmental inspections.
FBP workers stated that food and drink safety regulation was prioritised over labour regulation.
In both sectors, the focus of inspectors was on the quality of the products, not the workers'
welfare. Few labour inspectors go to factories to monitor labour standards, such as wages and
work hours, as stipulated in the Labour Code, consistent with a finding by Kim (2012).
Effects of inadequate regulatory practices
The proliferation of state and quasi-state regulations can also be costly to SMEs, and the
enforcement of state regulations can have ambiguous results. Most FBP management
interviewed abide by government regulations, but there were concerns about the lack of technical
sophistication among the government’s environmental officials and their unrealistic
expectations: ‘The environmental compliance and regulation are dependent on awareness of
people living in society and (government) officials who are in charge of environmental laws. For
example, the Environmental Office mandates that we treat waste water until it becomes type A
(or equivalent to potable water), but I have a different opinion. POD and COD [technical names
for different types of water] water must have micro-organisms to survive. Change in perspective
depends on the lawmakers and educated managers. So, due to the [high quality] requirements of
6-month water inspection, and the difficulty in treating water to type A, we were fined
occasionally’ (medium-size FBP firm).
In the TGF sector, thirty percent of interviewed factories reported obstacles that are
related to state regulations. These problems range from unclear state instructions, to timeconsuming paperwork requirements, to inadequate state regulation on labour standards issues,
such as wages and work hours. About 35% of interviewed TGF factories reported obstacles
related to state regulation of labour standards, with often-cited concerns such as stable wages,
and social and unemployment insurance. For instance, an owner of a medium-size garment
factory complained about inconsistent state instructions: ‘We are building an environmental
project according to the request of Ho Chi Minh City DONRE. The monitoring report is done
once every six months. This is a costly endeavor, because we do not completely understand the
instructions and have to hire other [consultancy] services (at about eight million VND)’. Other
managers complained about inconsistent government enforcement, leading to compliant
companies being at a disadvantage compared to those which did not comply: ‘At the moment, our
company spends an annual amount of four billion VND on chemicals used for processing [or
treating] waste, while many other companies do not do this. If that four billion VND is not spent
on waste treatment chemicals, then it can be used for other things such as expanding production.
At the same time, we have to keep our product prices the same as those of other companies’ (a
manager of a medium-size garment factory). An owner of a medium-size garment factory
lamented: ‘The waste water treatment system is expensive. It costs about 300 million VND (about
US $15,000), and it is installed once and for all... During inspection, the government can impose
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a fine of up to 500 million VND’. A manager from another medium-size garment factory
concurred: ‘Funds are required to carry out these responsibilities’.
Analysis of the 93 responses from FBP workers shows that most state inspectors went to
the factories to monitor and enforce environmental standards, not labour standards. None of the
workers interviewed mentioned state regulation of their wages, benefits and working hours.
Eighteen percent of the interviewed FBP workers (both females and males) mentioned that
regulation and inspection was aimed to ensure product quality and food safety/standards for
consumers’ health, not workers’ wellbeing. Only 5% mentioned that it was for labour standards
and safe working conditions. Here are some workers’ voices: ‘Thanks to the (state) inspection
teams who check work safety and environmental sanitation, the company products will be better
and ensured’ (a worker in a water company). ‘Inspectors come to check food safety in bakery. I
feel comfortable; no problems’ (male, small bread enterprise). From management’s perspective,
state regulation tends to focus on pollution control and occupational safety and health. One FBP
manager explained: ‘…waste water goes through a sedimentation tank, with a filtering net, and
an aerated process to treat waste water. Afterwards, we have a contract with a waste treatment
agency to process the waste water and the odor from waste water. …. We contract with District
8 sanitary department to collect regular trash’ (a manager from a medium-size seafood
company).
In both sectors, our findings show the benefits of state inspection to ensure worker safety
and hygienic working environment for workers. However, it also indicates inadequate state
regulation to inspect labour standards issues, such as wages and work hours.
Next, we present and discuss findings on the cognitive level by considering both Scott’s
institutional perspective (peoples understanding of industry norms) and critical perspective
(which reminds us to pay attention to historical legacy and people’s cultural practices for
centuries, or cultural norms).

Findings on the Cognitive Level
The cognitive level includes people’s shared conceptions that constitute the social reality and the
frames through which meaning is made. Normative/belief systems and regulatory factors
influence individuals’ understanding and reasoning (Scott 2001; Amine and Staub 2009). In this
section, we first present cognition of industry norms: how SME owners and workers understand
industry norms/standards (such as through codes of conduct). Then we explain the significance
of cultural practices by both owners and workers, or cognition of cultural norms.
Overall, we found that in both sectors, there is a divergence in the understanding of
management and workers on the meaning of industry norms, or codes of conduct. Many SME
managers expressed knowledge about codes of conduct and their requirements (certification,
sustainability report filing and monitoring) but financial constraints prevent them from engaging
in this process. On the other hand, most workers perceived codes of conduct as “regulations”
with which they have to comply. In both sectors, most workers used their own language to
describe what CSR means to them, not the formal CSR language.
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Cognition of Industry Norms in owners’ and workers’ voices
First are findings on cognition of industry norms from management perspectives in both sectors.
Seventy-five percent of the interviewed TGF factories manufacturing for export are conscious of
required industry standards. Most managers in TGF factories comply with private industry
standards in order to export their products. One manager in a medium-size garment firm
lamented: ‘we are required to implement CSR. If we do not, we would have to close our
business.’ But since many first-tier suppliers do not list these subcontractors on their supplier
lists, these SMEs are invisible to the general public.
With respect to the physical environment and the working environment, we found that
more FBP companies monitored and reported on their environments than did TGF factories. On
occupational health and safety and treatment of waste, 85% of FBP SMEs monitored waste,
water and energy compared to only 60% of the TGF SMEs. On company procedures for
handling Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) issues, the FBP SMEs reported higher
percentages: 60% (registering accidents) and 85% (health checks) compared to 50% and 60%
among the TGF SMEs respectively.
This difference may be due to more stringent government regulation in the FBP sector
(out of concern for consumers’ well-being), thus heightening management awareness and
practice of these norms. Around 50% of the FBP firms stated that they had improved the
working environment/conditions while only 40% reported improvements in the physical
environment (such as polluted water and air), which can be very costly for many small- and
medium-size FBP enterprises. A few managers in the FBP industry expressed a heightened
awareness of cleanliness and sanitation on behalf of their customers/consumers, such as:
‘Because our business is in the food processing industry, we are required to guarantee
consumers’ heath’ (a seafood company). This, however, did not translate into the health and
well-being of workers. Even so, more savvy managers had deployed ways to protect the
environment and workers: ‘We have to be responsible for the environment once we deploy
industrial production of a commodity. We have to grow plants, and treat waste water’ (a
distillery company).
Second, we present workers’ understanding of codes of conduct in both sectors. In both
sectors, workers believed that a code of conduct is about periodic inspections and a set of
regulations that tells them what to do, and what to avoid on the factory floor (in terms of health
and work safety). Only a few workers understood that it is about the responsibility of employers,
not of themselves, to improve labour standards and their working conditions. Based on workers’
own definitions of codes of conduct, we witness overlapping between industry norms and
cognition. First, workers’ misunderstanding could be interpreted as their intuition to comply with
a safe working environment for their own benefits. Second, it appears that some FBP workers in
the export-oriented companies were savvier than TGF workers in terms of recognizing some
global industry norms, such as HACCP and ISO 26000.
When doing factory visits, we noticed that company regulations were posted in
prominent places on the factory floor. Most interviewed factories have their own company
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regulations regardless of the existence of state regulation or industry norms and standards. In the
TGF factories, about 80% of the workers interpreted factory regulations as codes of conduct.
Some TGF workers mentioned: “workers should try their best to meet the company’s
requirements; company regulations can supervize workers’ whereabouts and use of safety
equipment. Regulations are good reminders for workers; regulations require punctuality, good
maintenance of machines, no shouting; sick leaves should be approved before taken.”
On the other hand, some 56% of FBP workers interpreted company regulations and
inspections as codes of conduct. Here are some examples of FBP workers’ responses: “Workers
are supposed to obey regulations if they want to keep their jobs; they inspect food safety,
environmental sanitation to ensure consumers' health; I don't know if there are any codes of
conduct. I only know that the company has regulations. I am pleased with the inspection. The
company management does very close inspection work, helping the workers to follow the
regulations; Owner explains regulations, especially those related to production safety, avoiding
risks of fire and explosions.”
Workers in both sectors expressed concerns about their working environment because it
affects their health and safety, with more concerns being registered by female workers. For FBP
workers, 76% expressed concerns with work safety and safe working environment. Many
appreciated having protective gears (such as working outfits, boots, hats and helmets, masks,
shoes and socks, aprons). A female worker in a seafood company said: “Equipment for work
safety is available [provided by management]: gloves, masks, protective working outfits, clean
and separate restrooms for males and females.” Another female worker in a fish sauce company
said: “Electric appliances are not really safe. [There is] risk of electric shocks; women should
not climb high when the electric pump is working. It's slippery and dangerous. [There is] flood
because of bad sewage system.” On the other hand, most TGF workers had to deal with lint, dust,
heat, odor, humidity and lack of ventilation. In a medium-size garment factory making leather
purses and gloves, a worker complained: ‘In the process of leather treatment, the odor is very
strong and unpleasant’. Fewer TGF SMEs had improved the working and physical environment
(25% and 35% respectively) compared to the FBP SMEs.
Cognition of Cultural Norms in owners’ and workers’ voices
We contribute to Scott’s cognitive pillar by highlighting a cultural component, recognizing the
significance of cultural norms in the context of labour standards. In both sectors, management
and workers are shaped by cultural norms and belief systems in their understanding and
practices.
First is management cognition of cultural norms. In both sectors, when asked for the
meaning of “company responsibility”, 72% of managers responded as “being a good corporate
citizen”, and only 38% stating that it was “to make profit” (Authors A). While 40% of the TGF
managers and 15% of the FBP managers were unaware of the formal concept of CSR, almost all
recognised the broad responsibilities of companies to the society at large. All interviewed
managers/owners felt responsible for labour standards, working conditions and working
environment and 90% felt responsible for the physical environment. One can argue that these
cultural norms transcend industry norms: these figures are much higher than the ones for the
industrial norms or foreign-imposed CSR practices. This is consistent with Scott’s argument
about resilience of social structures, relevant to socialist Vietnam.
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Our sample shows that many managers mentioned ‘culture’ and ‘history’ together:
around 50% of the firms seeing ‘history’ as having an impact (Authors A). For example, a few
TGF managers expressed awareness of the damages done to the people and the environment in
Vietnam due to the US-Vietnam war: ‘Businesses must also contribute to help victims of Agent
Orange [a toxic herbicide/chemical] used during the US-Vietnam war as well as injured and
disabled veterans’ (a medium-size garment factory). These activities can be considered
culturally-based CSR practices, Vietnamese style. In another case, a medium-size water
company expressed the influences of history and culture on these culturally-based CSR practices:
‘The Vietnamese people have a culture of solidarity, mutual sharing, being compassionate
toward other people, loving other people as loving oneself. When we make money, we need to
assist and share with less fortunate people and our own workers. Managers and workers should
relate to each other as family members’.
Second is about workers’ cognition of cultural norms. Many workers interpret codes of
conduct as relationships between employers and employees, which can be positive or negative.
Some examples from TGF workers include: “company management treats workers well and nice
attitude towards us; fair treatment at work and courteous when interacting with workers; the
situation is favorable because of good relationships with the owner; the company has no welldefined regulations: the owner shouts at workers whenever he wants.” Some examples from
FBP workers include: “I don't understand what code of conduct means, but I think it refers to an
equal relation between employer and employees; reflecting civilised work ethics in public office;
this is to build up a "company culture" here; at the company, relations among workers are good.
Inappropriate relations will be immediately reprimanded.”
Third, we present concrete examples of how management and workers in both sectors
rely on cultural practices to relate to each other. Religious beliefs and cultural practices influence
managers to give contributions to the local community and for religious celebrations. Most
SMEs interviewed—irrespective of location, size, and sector—upheld cultural practices dating
back to the socialist era (prior to the market-reform policy that started in the late 1980s). These
social practices include the additional 13th month pay (the ‘Tet bonus’) to celebrate the
Vietnamese Lunar New Year and to support the families of migrant workers.
Most companies often advance small amounts of money to workers and deduct the
amount from the workers’ monthly paychecks. This practice meets urgent needs of workers so
they can pay for basic necessities, illnesses, or trips home to take care of family members: 60%
of the FBP provided loans, while 50% of the TGF did. Most medium-size factory managers
provided some forms of entertainment, such as newspapers, sporting events, musical
entertainment, cable TV and access to the Internet to enhance workers’ cultural lives.
In the TGF sector, having time flexibility is one of the most often-cited reasons by both
female and male workers for them to remain with a company. Considering the lack of living
wages as discussed above, workers used time flexibility as an important “labour condition” to
bargain with management. Many interviewed managers gave workers days off for personal leave
(sick leave, weddings and funerals), cultural events and traditional Vietnamese holidays. In
return, many migrant workers expressed appreciation for such flexible work schedules. A
manager said: ‘Whenever migrant workers from the South have funerals, weddings, or death
anniversaries, we have to allow them to go back to their home towns/villages’ (a garment
factory). Since most workers are young and many are migrants, they have family obligations and
need more education, so it is important to have: ‘Permission to take time off for family matters’
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(a worker in a small garment company); ‘Flexible hours; Good relationship between owner and
workers’ (a worker in a small shoe company); ‘Permission to take time off is the most important
factor because I am a student and am doing part-time job’ (a worker in a medium-size garment
company). In the FBP sector, the need for flexibility is similar: ‘Those who are in difficult
circumstances can borrow several million VND… Workers can take day-offs to attend to their
family business, we still pay them for their sick leaves.'’ (a manager of a beef jerky producing
company).
In the export-oriented TGF sector, on-time delivery is vital for subcontracting work; thus
most managers placed a high value on stable employment and connections between skills and
product quality for their enterprises’ commercial viability. Over 90% of all SME management
interviewed considered both ‘workers’ and ‘customers’ (or buyers) to be the most influential
stakeholders. For instance, an owner of a small leather factory said: ‘Because they [the workers]
determine the quality of our products’. Another garment-factory owner said: ‘If workers are
careful and produce good-quality products that receive no complaints from our partners
[customers/buyers], the company will not be negatively affected’.
We observed more ‘family-like’ type of management-workers relations in the more
domestic-oriented FBP sector, compared to the exported-oriented TGF. Treating workers like
family members tends to happen in small enterprises and has both positive and negative
outcomes. On the positive side, many owners/managers exhibited tolerant, compassionate, and
flexible cultural practices that cared for workers and treated them like family. Interviews with the
FBP factories showed that stable employment (especially with signed labour contracts), mutually
respectful communications and harmonious labour-management relations were the key labour
conditions expected on the factory floor. Forty-five percent of all FBP workers expressed their
appreciation for management concerns, equal treatment and harmonious relations with the
bosses. Workers expressed appreciation when being treated kindly: ‘Owner treats workers as
family, not as master and servants. The owner and his wife are very nice to the workers’ (a small
noodle shop). A worker in a small water company praised, ‘Free meals. Treated like family
members. No pressure on workers. Generous offers and treat workers with drinks and meals’. A
group of workers in a medium-size pasta factory said: ‘There is bonus for good work
performance. Uncle Ba is very concerned about workers’. Another worker in a medium-size
garment factory said, ‘Co-workers are like brothers in a family. Concerned about each other’.
However, family structure can exhibit hierarchical and patriarchal relations in Vietnam.
Some workers lamented about being reprimanded and treated like ‘children’ or ‘younger
siblings’. A worker in a medium-size garment factory said: ‘Manager creates convenient
situations for workers to deal with family matters, but reprimands them in case of errors’.
Another worker in a small bottled water factory said: ‘The owner is concerned and friendly. But
when workers made mistakes, they were scolded [like children]’.

DISCUSSION
In response to the research questions: “What does CSR mean to SME owners and their workers
in manufacturing and food processing in terms of norms, regulation and cognition? In which
ways does this western concept influence/affect workers and owners in these two different
industries?” Scott’s institutional framework is helpful in dissecting varying levels of different
types of institutional pressures and how they contribute to different outcomes in TGF and FBP
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sectors. First we discuss the usefulness of Scott’s framework in explaining the similarities and
differences between these two sectors; then we explain our contributions, informed by the critical
perspectives, to the institutional framework.
Scott’s three-pillar framework is helpful in highlighting both similarities and differences
between these two sectors in terms of the meaning of CSR. On similarities, in both sectors, we
found more emphasis of state regulation and industry pressure on the quality and safety of
company products rather than on labour and working conditions. In the export-oriented TGF,
there were high certification fees and inspection fees on garment products, but inadequate state
regulation on labour standards. In the domestic-oriented FBP, there was frequent on-site state
inspection to monitor compliance with food/drink safety guidelines/standards (set by the
Vietnamese Food Administration), but not on labour standards.11 On cognition, management in
both sectors recognised “socially responsible practices” and acknowledged “cultural and
historical practices” (see Table 1 for the summary of the findings). When asked about which
elements and practices (labour standards, environmental, working conditions) that workers and
managers considered as socially responsible, almost 100% responded positively in their own
terms, focusing on their environment and working conditions. We found overwhelming support
among workers and managers to practices informed by historical and cultural norms, such as not
polluting, securing a clean working environment, and achieving a living wage and decent work
hours. This is consistent with the arguments made by Murillo & Lozano that, while CSR, a
foreign concept, is understood as a regulatory language, SMEs’ owners and workers use their
own language to explain each of their factory’s organizational culture and practices, not as an
operative language (Murillo & Lozano, 2006).
Scott’s three-pillar framework is helpful in identifying the differences between these two
sectors. First, many workers in the export-oriented TGF sector misunderstood codes of conduct
as their responsibilities, whereas workers in the domestic-oriented FBP sector were more aware
of their rights on safe and hygiene working environment (see Table 1). Second, the adoption of
industry norms and compliance with state regulations are costly to the SMEs. This condition
affects the export-oriented TGF more than the domestic-oriented FBP companies. We found
that the brands (and their first-tier suppliers) use CSR appeal to appease their final consumers
by placing the burden of practice and proof onto their lower-tier TGF subcontractors. Most
TGF owners cannot afford the costs of codes of conduct certification and remediation of their
violations. Nevertheless, the managers and the workers in these TGF SMEs absorb those costs
to get the work orders, as other studies have shown (Baden et al. 2009; Fassin 2008;
Skadegaard Thorsen and Jeppesen 2010). Moreover, the different nature of these two sectors—
one durable and the other perishable—and their levels of insertion into the global economy can
also explain their differences. While both sectors are subjected to the same progressive Labour
Code, social insurance law and regulatory system, we found stricter state regulations in the FBP
sector, most likely due to the perishable nature of the FBP products and important health
implications for human consumption. In contrast, the export-oriented TGF factories are less
influenced by state regulation, but under more pressure by industry norms/global standards.

11

In the smaller group of FBP companies (25%) that produce for export, management had to comply with additional international food safety
standards.
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However, our application of Scott’s framework to the Vietnam case revealed two
observations which form our contributions: 1. the significance of the overlapping of the pillars,
and 2. the implications of uneven power relations in the global supply chains.
Recognizing the overlapping can shed light on the nuanced institutional pressures and
how they contribute to different outcomes in TGF and FBP sectors. The first overlapping is
between the normative (industry norms) and the regulatory (labour legislation and state
regulations) pillars. The most common code of conduct of many industry norms refers to the
compliance with national labour legislation, or the Labour Code and the Social Insurance Law.
The misunderstanding of both TGF and FBP workers on codes of conduct as their
responsibilities points to the connection between labour legislation/state regulation and industry
norms. Moreover, this overlapping can explain migrant workers’ searching around the city for
jobs with perceived higher wages due to the lack of a living wage and social, health or
unemployment benefits as stipulated in the Labour Code. The resulting accommodations of
many SME managers to keep workers explain how they value stable employment as a win-win
outcome for both labour and management.
The second overlapping is between cognitive and industry norm pillars. On cognition of
industry norms, owners/managers in both sectors are more informed about the formal
(imported) definition of CSR than are the workers. In both sectors, most workers think of codes
of conduct as company regulations and inspection to which they need to comply, instead of
responsibilities that corporations promise them. But while CSR as a foreign symbol has been
imposed on the Vietnamese economy over the last 15 years, SME managers and workers in
both sectors relate to each other, informed by cultural practices. As such, this overlapping
highlights the significance of cultural norms, very significant within the Vietnamese context.
For instance, workers were proactive in using their own terms, focusing on the “relationships”
language with their employers and co-workers on the shop floor. Cultural norms in the exportoriented TGF sector allow TGF workers to bargain for flexible work schedules during down
times in exchange for stressful work schedule in high seasons. On the other hand, cultural
norms in the domestic-serving FBP factories accommodated better job stability, respectful
communications and harmonious relations with management.
However, we found some limits to cultural norms which can perpetuate power relations
between labour and management, as well as patriarchal relations of workers being treated like
family members in small enterprises. For instance, while small advances/loans can be a shortterm benefit to workers for basic necessities, this common practice reinforces the paternal
relationships, perpetuates the cycle of indebtedness and the precarious hand-to-mouth existence
experienced by many workers. It does not solve the root cause of this problem: lack of
regulation and enforcement of the most basic code of conduct related to the Labour Code—
wages and overtime in both sectors.
However, the Scott framework does not reflect unequal power relations among the
actors in the multi-tiered global supply chains. We incorporate different levels of linkage to
such global systems into Scott’s framework to explain different outcomes in FBP and TGF
sectors. In terms of job stability, the domestic-oriented FBP sector (with better linkage to the
domestic economy) tended to fare better than the TGF sector that produced mostly for export
and had to deal with the vicissitude of the global supply chains and the dependency on
imported inputs. In 2010-2011, most FBP workers were able to keep their jobs longer,
compared to the job losses in the export-oriented TGF factories. While the five export-oriented
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FBP factories face similar global fluctuations as did the export-oriented TGF factories, FBP
factories have control over domestic raw materials (such as seafood, vegetables, passion fruits,
and aloe vera plants). As such, these FBP factories have influence and control over the
domestic suppliers of their inputs, compared to the export-oriented TGF SMEs. On the other
hand, in the export-oriented TGF factories, SME managers in the lowest rung of the global
supply chain had to cut wages to deal with tough price competition. Many interviewed
managers pointed to the MNCs’ failure to share these CSR-related costs, adding more costs to
the compliant SMEs, and leaving less for workers’ wages which are not livable as required by
the Vietnamese Labour Code. Situated in the lower tiers of the global supply chains without
cost sharing from MNCs and their suppliers, CSR compliance is beyond the control of most
TGF SMEs. Future research is needed to examine the connections among domestic linkage,
insertion in the global supply chains and CSR.
Table 1: Overview of main findings on the normative, regulatory and cognitive pillars among
workers and managers in the interviewed SMEs
Normative:
TGF MANAGEMENT:
- 60% know ‘CSR’
- Industry norms and standards key (e.g. 75%
adhere to codes of conduct)
- No assistance from first-tier suppliers, or brands on certification and inspection fees
TGF WORKERS:
-Wages low – forced to overtime work
Regulative:
TGF MANAGEMENT:
- Inadequate state regulation on labour standards
issues, but state and quasi-state inspection play a
more important role in environmental regulation
- High certification fees and inspection fees
- No assistance from government for certification
and compliance
- Time-consuming reports
TGF WORKERS:
- Weak and inconsistent state regulation
- More rigorous environmental regulation than
regulation on labour standards
- Not wearing masks, even when they are issued,
due to poorly ventilated conditions
Cognitive:
TGF MANAGEMENT:
- Many ‘codes’ (or guidelines) found among
numerous firms

Normative:
FBP MANAGEMENT:
- 80% know ‘CSR’
- Few with industry codes and standards (25%, such as
HACCP, GMP, ISO)
- No assistance from customers, or brands
- High level of expenses (in exporting factories)
FBP WORKERS:
Wages low – forced to overtime work
Regulative:
FBP MANAGEMENT:
- Local government inspections monitor compliance
with food/drink safety guidelines
- No ‘free-of-charge’ assistance from government for
compliance, but options to pay for services
- Some comply with the Vietnamese Food
Administration standard (see the Normative section)

FBP WORKERS:
- Weak and inconsistent state regulation
- More rigorous food and safety regulation than
regulation on labour standards
- Appreciated protective gears (working outfits, boots,
hats & helmets, masks, shoes & socks, aprons, etc.)
Cognitive:
FBP MANAGEMENT:
- Vast majority conducting environmental and
occupational safety and health practices
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- Very high (nearly 100%) recognition of ‘social
responsible practices’
- Acknowledgement of ‘cultural and historical
practices’ (loans, leave, donations etc.)
TGF WORKERS:
- Codes of conduct are viewed as workers’
responsibilities
- Appreciation of ‘cultural and historical
practices’ (loans, leave, etc.)
- Time flexibility as bargaining tool
- Mixed attitudes towards ‘family relations’

- Very high (nearly 100%) recognition of ‘social
responsible practices’
- Acknowledgement of ‘cultural and historical
practices’ (loans, leave, donations etc.)
FBP WORKERS:
- Concerned with and aware of their rights on safe
working environment
- Acknowledgement of ‘cultural and historical
practices’
- Mixed attitudes towards ‘family relations’
- Appreciation of job security

Source: The authors

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Scott’s institutional framework is useful in highlighting both similarities and sectoral differences
as discussed above. But our application of Scott’s framework to the Vietnam case revealed two
important observations, hence our contributions, informed by the critical perspectives. First, it is
important to pay attention to the overlapping nature of the pillars, such as between the normative
and regulatory pillars, and between normative and cognitive pillars as discussed above. Further
theoretical work is needed to explore these overlaps. Second, the unequal power relations among
the actors in the multi-tiered global supply chains are not reflected in the Scott’s framework. Our
article contributes to Scott’s institutional framework by incorporating different levels of linkage
to the global system to explain different outcomes in FBP and TGF sectors. We demonstrate how
the MNCs and their first-tier suppliers shirk their responsibilities toward their SME
subcontractors at second, third and sometimes fourth tier, and showcase the perspectives of SME
management and their workers at these lower tiers which are often hidden from the general
public.
Finally, what can be done to improve labour standards in Vietnam? What are the role of
the MNCs and the role of the state? First, the MNCs need to recognize publicly the existence of
the SMEs in their global supply chains. Second, the MNCs need to share the CSR costs with
SME owners in both sectors to fulfill the general public’s expectations of business impacts on
society, especially on working conditions and labour standards. Third, both workers and
managers pointed to the need for stronger state enforcement of the Vietnamese Labour Code,
directly connected to most codes of conduct and global industry standards. Thus, the government
needs to strengthen state monitoring and regulation to protect both the consumers and the
workers. Last but not least, the MNCs should share the costs of training courses on codes of
conduct at the SME level so that workers can improve their knowledge of industrial norms in
order to demand their legitimate rights and entitlements promised by the stated CSR intentions
via codes of conduct.
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